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ent lack of anti-union animus invalidates pre-
dictions of the demise of trade unionism. The 
favorable attitudes to trade unionism on both 
sides of industry reflect durable perceptions, 
such as the judgment of many managers that 
trade unions help them communicate with 
the work force in large workplaces and facili-
tate the introduction of changes. 
While the survey research supporting earlier 
continuity theses was apt to overlook the poten-
tial of novel forms of management, Gallie et al. 
are dismissive of those management systems, 
which, they contend, have been introduced 
piecemeal and have not affected employees' 
attitudes toward trade unionism. However, their 
data base is not, in my judgment, sufficient to 
sustain such a blanket assertion, nor the claim 
that the new management forms may be comple-
ments to rather than substitutes for bargaining. 
None of the researchers explore such issues 
sufficiently, and where management's behavior 
is examined, it is only within highly specific 
contexts. Moreover, the editors' focus on com-
monalities across employers constrains their 
exploration of the variety of management prac-
tice. 
Research based on British Social Attitudes 
survey data suggests that new management meth-
ods may not have had any significant effect on 
employees' perceptions of how management 
treats them. Of more interest, however, may be 
the effects of the development of such methods 
on management's attitudes, the seeds of which 
may have been sown in the 1980s. An aversion 
to any revival of unionism in Britain is evident 
among managers, and such research as we have 
suggests that a growing attachment to human 
resource management, itself driven by broader 
initiatives such as TQM (as is borne out by 
Gallie et al.'s data), underlies this. This implies 
the need for an approach to managerial per-
spectives that is evolutionary and employs a 
greater range of concepts than that used by 
Gallie et al. 
The book's strengths make it important read-
ing for all researchers of British industrial rela-
tions, especially those focusing on managerial 
attitudes or union membership. The case stud-
ies may be especially valuable for teaching pur-
poses. The book's weaknesses expose how little 
we still know about managerial behavior and 
how under-conceptualized is its study. 
Stephen Wood 
Reader in Industrial Relations 
London School of Economics 
and Political Science 
We Can't Eat Prestige. By J o h n H oe r r . Phila-
de lph ia : T e m p l e University Press, 1997. 
2 8 0 p p . ISBN 1-56639-535-6,$29.95 (c lo th) . 
In 1988 the fifteen-year campaign to orga-
nize office and laboratory workers at Harvard 
University ended with an NLRB election win. 
We Can't Eat Prestige is the most comprehensive 
examination to date of this compelling story, 
offering new detail and sufficiently bold asser-
tions to re-ignite a smoldering debate about 
what this victory means for the future of unions. 
The author is a highly regarded journalist with 
thirty years of experience reporting on labor 
issues. Predictably, the book is extraordinarily 
well written, weaving a fascinating story of the 
union's evolution. 
Hoerr asserts that the Harvard Union of Cleri-
cal and Technical Workers (HUCTW) became a 
"unique local union," one that was consciously 
constructed to manifest a "feminine model of 
trade unionism." These conclusions are re-
served for Chapter 15, and to appreciate their 
basis it is essential to explore with Hoerr the 
events, organizations, and personalities that 
ultimately shaped the HUCTW. 
The story begins in 1973 in the university's 
Medical Area. Inspired by the women's move-
ment, lab assistant Leslie Sullivan initiated a 
newsletter for hourly employees. It contained 
"more information about employment at 
Harvard than Harvard itself had ever dissemi-
nated." A nascent women's group attracted new 
participants, and a year later a militant core 
announced a union drive. Affiliation with Dis-
trict 65 followed, and Sullivan was hired to 
coordinate an organizing campaign. The long, 
tumultuous relationship between Harvard's 
white-collar workers and organized labor had 
begun. 
The book goes on to trace the case history in 
rich detail through two NLRB election losses in 
the Medical Area in 1977 and 1981, then the 
five-year effort for a campus-wide unit that es-
tablished the HUCTW as bargaining agent in 
1988. Sullivan coordinated the first campaign, 
"with District 65 contributing only a distant 
muttering of advice." For the second effort 
funding was provided for an additional orga-
nizer, and Sullivan selected Kristine Rondeau, a 
young research assistant in the Medical School. 
After the second loss Sullivan moved on but 
Rondeau stayed. When the UAW decided to 
sponsor a third organizing campaign in 1983, 
Rondeau was selected to lead it. 
Hoerr describes the "singular style of orga-
nizing" weaved together by the Rondeau orga-
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nizing team. Based on the conviction that 
Harvard's white-collar workers did not feel op-
pressed, the idea was to concentrate on build-
ing a community. This was accomplished by 
using one-on-one organizing techniques so that 
each worker would feel "connected" to the 
union. The organizing did not emphasize is-
sues, but promised (vaguely) to provide a voice. 
Rather than appealing to anger, the union talked 
of improving the university and adopted the 
slogan, "It's not anti-Harvard to be pro-union." 
Building relationships and a sense of com-
munity where there was no real enemy proved 
to be a slow process. A 1985 UAW report con-
cluded that the campaign was "not progressing 
fast enough." Subsequently Rondeau became 
embroiled in a bitter confrontation with UAW 
Regional Director Ted Barrett. The reader 
will get a rare inside look at the difficulties 
that arise when an aggressive and innovative 
staff member decides to pursue her own 
agenda against the preferences of the parent 
union. In this case the Rondeau team took 
the unusual step of seceding and the HUCTW 
was born. 
For over a year the HUCTW survived on a 
meager budget while competing with a new 
group of UAW organizers. In January 1987 
an affiliation agreement was signed with 
AFSCME la rge ly on R o n d e a u ' s t e r m s : 
AFSCME provided a substantial subsidy, but 
Rondeau exercised total control over the or-
ganizing. The UAW soon withdrew, and the 
HUCTW prevailed by a bare margin in the 
1988 representat ion election, winning 50.7% 
of the vote. 
The book concludes with a description of the 
HUCTW's "unique labor agreement." Hoerr 
interprets the initial negotiating process as a 
continuation of the union's organizing style. 
Deliberations were extensive, and decisions 
were reached by consensus. The result was a 
contract devoid of rules, with no grievance pro-
cedure but rather the outline of a collaborative 
approach to solve problems. Although success 
in providing an effective forum where workers 
can influence decisions "has been limited by the 
resistance of top-level Harvard administrators," 
the HUCTW retains its commitment to "peace-
ful resolution" of problems and to a focus on 
"being happy." Thus the decision to reject a 
strike during difficult negotiations in 1992 is 
portrayed as demonstrating "a feminine kind of 
strength." 
Although this book has clear plusses, there 
are also serious shortcomings. When dealing 
with the specifics of the case, it excels. Unfortu-
nately, when Hoerr strays from primary source 
material to discuss union strategy, labor history, 
labor law, or feminist theory, he reveals limited 
familiarity with complex subjects. A penchant 
for journalistic approximation will trouble many 
labor relations academics. 
For example, Hoerr accurately describes 
the strategy followed by the Harvard organiz-
ers, but his at tempt to place it in a broader 
context falls short. He counterposes the 
Rondeau approach with one credited to "men 
organizers": "Traditional methods included 
passing out flyers and setting up large meet-
ings to see how many would show up." Those 
familiar with union organizing will recognize 
a straw man. By 1988, there was virtual con-
sensus among successful organizers (men and 
women alike) that a one-on-one approach 
was the best option in the private sector. 
Harvard is a valuable example of one version 
of that option, but it is not a unique excep-
tion to the norm as argued. 
A related drawback is the author ' s open 
bias. Hoerr consistently embraces Rondeau 's 
interpretat ion, no matter how peculiar. For 
example, the legitimate concerns of District 
65 and the UAW regarding budgets and per-
formance of staff are presented as onerous 
and unwarranted intrusions into the affairs 
of the Harvard organizers . Conversely, 
AFSCME's b lankcheck approach (eightyears 
after the election, fifteen HUCTW staff re-
mained on the national payroll) is ment ioned 
only in passing. If lessons are to be drawn 
from the Harvard case, these issues of trade 
union administration must be analyzed dis-
passionately. 
Even the book's ultimate conclusion, that 
the HUCTW represents a unique feminine 
model of unionism, is not subjected to serious 
scrutiny. Experienced organizers understand 
that white-collar workers prefer to solve prob-
lems through discussion rather than confronta-
tion; this is not a feminine issue per se. Further-
more, female unionists in repressive work envi-
ronments often embrace militant tactics. Even 
clerical workers at universities have engaged in 
spirited strikes. Hoerr never explains why the 
HUCTW approach is "feminine" while the be-
havior of other female unionists implicitly is 
not. 
In spite of these weaknesses, this is a valu-
able book, especially for those interested in 
the internal operation of unions. Hoerr ' s 
account gives us an intimate look at how 
Rondeau and associates go about their work 
and how they view the outside world, includ-
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ing the institutions that underwrite their ac-
tivities. 
Richard W. Hurd 
New York State School of 
Industrial and Labor Relations 
Cornell University 
Labor Economics 
On-the-job Training. By J o h n M. Bar ron , 
M a r k C. B e r g e r , a n d D a n A. B l a c k . 
Kalamazoo, Mich.: W.E. U p j o h n Inst i tute 
for E m p l o y m e n t Research, 1997. viii, 207 
p p . ISBN 0-88099-178-X, $25.00 (c lo th) ; 0-
88099-175-5, $15.00 ( p a p e r ) . 
Since the publication in 1964 of Gary Becker's 
Human Capital, the theory of on-the-job train-
ing has become a standard weapon in the arse-
nal of labor economists. Two of the key propo-
sitions of OJT theory are the following. First, 
jobs that offer training will have lower starting 
wages than those that do not, to reflect the cost 
of training. Second, general training results in 
identical increases in the growth rates of pro-
ductivity and wages. Of course, both of these 
are ceteris paribus relationships; and the authors' 
ability to hold other relevant factors constant is 
an issue that surfaces repeatedly throughout 
the empirical analysis. 
After a brief introductory chapter, readers 
are walked through a concise description of a 
Beckerian model of general and specific human 
capital. Included in this treatment are interest-
ing discussions of the information requirements 
of the OJT model and the empirical difficul-
ties of testing OJT theory. Not surprisingly, 
sample selection rears its ugly head as a fac-
tor likely to confound estimates of the pre-
dicted effects of OJT. The authors also intro-
duce in this chapter two alternative classes of 
models explaining upward-sloping wage-ten-
u re re la t ionsh ips—namely , l e a r n i n g / j o b 
matching models and incentive-based com-
pensation models. 
Chapter 3 describes the main characteristics 
of the two data sets used to measure OJT. These 
are the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot 
Project (EOPP) and the 1992 Small Business 
Administration (SBA) survey. Both surveys pro-
vide employer reports of ( l) the number of 
hours of training received by newly hired work-
ers in their first three months on the job, and 
(2) the length of time needed to become fully 
qualified if the worker has no previous experi-
ence on the job. The second measure indicates 
the total human capital imbedded in a particu-
lar job. 
In Chapter 4, these data are used to examine 
access to training. The data show that training 
is nearly universal for newly hired workers. In 
addition, college graduates and employees in 
large establishments receive more OJT than 
high school graduates and employees in small 
establishments. Truncation in the hours of 
training measure appears to hide race and gen-
der differences in training that show up strongly 
in the length of time needed to become fully 
qualified. For example, it is found that 36-46% 
less time is needed to become fully trained for 
jobs held by nonblack women than for those 
held by nonblack men. 
In Chapter 5, Barron, Berger, and Black 
step back to consider how accurately training 
is measured in their data. To answer this 
question, the authors use a new survey they 
designed (with funding by the Upjohn Insti-
tute) that matches employer and employee 
responses to training questions. This new 
survey indicates that while there is consider-
able agreement on the incidence of training, 
the co r r e l a t i on be tween employer - and 
worker-reported training hours is not very 
high, with firms report ing about 25% more 
training hours than do employees. Unfortu-
nately, the small n u m b e r of c o m p l e t e d 
matches restricts the survey's usefulness for 
answering the major empirical questions. It 
is used profitably, however, in Chapter 6 to 
construct instruments for the training vari-
ables in an at tempt to correct for measure-
ment error in wage regressions. 
The heart of the analysis is found in Chapter 
6. With respect to the first of the two key 
propositions of OJT theory, the SBA and EOPP 
data sets indicate that hours of on-site training 
have a negative but quantitatively small effect 
on starting wages. Hours of off-site training 
unexpectedly increase starting wages. Turning 
to the second proposition, the same surveys 
indicate that training increases both productiv-
ity growth and wage growth, but that the esti-
mated effect on productivity growth is approxi-
mately ten times the effect on wage growth. 
Both of these findings suggest that most train-
ing is specific to firms providing the training. 
Nevertheless, EOPP data indicate that nearly 
60% ofemployers surveyed report that the train-
ing they provide is portable to other employers. 
Up to this point in the monograph, the au-
thors' working hypothesis is that high-ability 
